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FORUM JURIDICUM
CHURCH AUTONOMY IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL
ORDER: THE END OF CHURCH AND STATE?
Gerard V. Bradley*
Was I scared floating around in a little yellow raft off the coast
of an enemy-held island, setting a world record for paddling?
Of course I was. What sustains you in times like that? Well,
you go back to fundamental values. I thought about Mother
and Dad and the strength I got from them-and God and faith
and the separation of Church and State.
-George Bush, on the campaign trail.
"Separation of church and state" is right up there with Mom, apple
pie, and baseball in American iconography. That George Bush had to
fudge the truth about his narrow escape attests to that. At least one
hopes that the young pilot's thoughts on meeting his Maker turned to
something more suitable than constitutional law. Even a Supreme Court
junkie's priorities are not that askew. But if Bush's commitments remain
partially obscured, those of his audience-the American voter-do not.
Evidently, John Q. Citizen requires that the faintest whiff of a public
man's religiosity be accompanied by assurances that, of course, God
and Caesar remain securely in their respective domains. This is not solely
a Republican phenomenon. Greek Orthodox Church officers provided
the Democratic counterpoint to Bush's war story. They were asked about
Michael Dukakis' standing in their church. They wouldn't say, and
scolded their interlocutors. The Archdiocese said:
With regret, we have observed recent attempts being made to
inject religion into the political life of this nation, in direct
contradiction to the First Amendment, and we will not become
party to this effort.'
Another way of evidencing this consensus is to ask yourself if you
know anyone who favors "integration" of church and state. The structure of a recent survey, the "Williamsburg Charter Survey on Religion
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and Public Life," illustrates that almost no one does. 2 On this foundational issue this survey gave respondents two options that amounted
only to "strong" and "weak" emphasis on separation, but offered no
option for "no separation." Aside from a small number of Christian
Reconstructionists and totalitarian atheists, no party to the public debate
on church and state wittingly questions separation of the two. Noises
resembling such questions turn out to be either rhetorically-overheated
denunciations of "strict separationists" like the ACLU, or the ACLU's
denunciations of its denunciators.
If everyone agrees on separation of church and state, why does the
relationship between religion and public life so vex, excite, and confound
us? Part of the reason is that church-state separation, although it is
the historical achievement of societies decisively shaped by a Christianity
that was itself decisively shaped by Judaism,3 is a commodious concept.
The basic differentiation of orders denoted by "separation" does not,
for instance, determine the propriety of state aid to parochial schools.
Persons equally devoted to separation of church and state can legitimately
end up on opposite sides of that question.
But "separation of church and state" is not contentless, and our
conclusive agreement on it, I submit, provides a valuable common frame
of reference in an otherwise discordant or "pluralistic" aspect of our
life together. Americans do more than agree on "separation." They
intuitively appreciate that "separation" is also the precondition of religious freedom. And religious freedom, which is usefully defined as
political authority permitting (in the words of the Fourth Gospel) "the
spirit to roam where it wills," 4 is near-universally acclaimed a good
thing and a distinctive feature of the American regime. This leads to
Bush's predicament. Anything that sounds less than unequivocally "separationist" betrays religious liberty, because the commonly-held conclusion is that to preserve religion in America we must keep Christianity
at bay, as walled-off from public life as possible. Thus the accepted
ideal is Richard Neuhaus' "naked public square," 5 one from which
religious discourse has effectively been evicted.
The Constitution enters the fray as well. We all know it protects
religious freedom, and that the Supreme Court insists the First Amend-

2. See summary of Williamsburg Charter Survey on Religion and Public Life in
America, in Religion & Soc'y Rep. B4 (April 1988).
3. Virtually any claim about Christianity's impact upon history includes within it
important Jewish elements. Even parochial Christians confess formative Jewish influences
upon their faith. Also, and for reasons beyond this paper's scope, Christianity's kinship
with other forms of Western monotheism-Judaism, Islam, and Mormonism (if the latter
is not within Christianity)-means that certain family resemblances among historical societies shaped by each are likely.
4. John 3:8
5. R. Neuhaus, The Naked Public Square (1984).
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ment erects a "wall of separation" between church and state. The Court
has consistently followed the same sequence of premises to the same
commonly-held conclusion: that the wall is necessary to protect religious
liberty. This conclusion has a quite respectable pedigree. It is the guts
of the two hundred-odd year-old Enlightenment project to legitimate
government and carry on political life without implicating religious commitments. Modern liberal theorists like John Rawls6 and Bruce Ackerman,
(among many others) continue this project, and expand the definition
of forbidden resources to include all conceptions of objective value or
of what it is truly "good" for persons to do. The position of these
modern liberals, like that of their Enlightenment ancestors, is fueled by
the belief that in a "pluralistic" society, publicly loosed religion leads
in the short run to unmanageable conflict and in the long run to an
authoritarian polity. Richard Rorty goes so far as to say that religion
taken seriously threatens democracy, and that we must choose between
commitment to religious truth and commitment to tolerance. Rorty reads
Rawls as saying that we cannot have both, and we cannot live together
peaceably unless we sheath our religious convictions by "privatizing"
them, by limiting their relevance to our own individual spirtualities.8
All this is much too clumsy. It is quite true that certain religionsIslam is one-are in principle "intolerant" in some important sense. It
is also quite true that others-eastern spiritually and certain quietistic
Christian strands like Quakerism-are so politically indifferent that they
make liberals like Rawls seem intolerant. The problem with statements
like Rorty's is the failure to see that a religion's potential for political
intolerance is entirely dependent upon that religion's precepts about truth
and error, mistake and evil, how to treat persons with mistaken beliefs
or who do evil, and what role, if any, political power should play in
this process. Christians now almost universally accept that while God
wants each person to love Him and do His will, it is God's will that
persons freely choose to do that. (Ironically, many mainline Christian
churches are now so "tolerant" that they dare not "impose" any particular conception of God's will upon their own members!) It may well
be that at the dawn of the Enlightenment this insight, which the Church
has quite consistently preached through the centuries, was obscured by
some politically ambitious Christians. But the Enlightenment project rules
out, as a possible exit from the problem, just that spiritual reform
which has in fact occurred.
My view is that the Enlightenment or "liberal" (in its contemporary
incarnation) project is an idea whose time has passed. Our time demands

6.
7.
8.

See J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971).
See B. Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State (1980).
Rorty, Taking Philosophy Seriously, New Republic 31, 33 (April 11, 1988).
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a rethinking of the "problem" of church and state and its "solution."
The Enlightenment attempt to keep a concrete political society going
without religious or other commitments to objective value has not and
is not working. Olaf Tollefsen correctly claims that such theories, because
they result in a practical solipsism that they are partly designed to
escape, end by consigning humans to lives empty of any significant
human enterprise. 9 Kent Greenawalt persuasively argues that some political issues cannot be resolved without recourse to religious convictions. 0 Greenawalt uses abortion as an example; I would add many
others, including state regulation of reproductive technology and the
cluster of issues usually associated with "the right to die."
If you wonder how we post-Enlightenment generations have gotten
along with an architectonic theory that is unworkable, my response is
threefold. First, "liberal" theories may not be "liberal" after all. As
Tollefsen argues, to avoid practical solipsism, they may import a robust
conception of objective human ends and values. If so, such theories are
not trans-creedal or super-sectarian solutions to the problem of religious
factionalism, but just another creed that happens to be presently regnant.
Second, we have not been getting along with them because we have
not been using them. As a matter of fact, our common life has been
ordered by political operatives, with the happy cooperation of the governed, in violation of Enlightenment principles. We have been resorting
to religion, through the moral, ethical, and religious precepts of our
political leaders. I must add that our Constitution was not interpreted
as proscribing this until after World War II, when the Supreme Court
began dismantling America's "implicit" Christian establishment." In
short, liberal theories may seem plausible-and affordable-precisely
because we are living off the religiosity the theories tell us we cannot
legitimately use.
The third reason is really a reason for the first two. Greenawalt
and other authors 2 have identified the impossible demands that liberal
theories place upon the human psyche. Liberalism would require humans
who possess religious convictions-characteristically, their self definition-to put them on hold while participating in public life. Since people
cannot do that, these convictions seep into the public sphere.
There are other reasons for a renewed look at the relationship among
Christianity, separation of church and state, and religious liberty in

9. Tollefsen, Practical Solipsism and "Thin" Theories of Human Goods, in 61 The
Metaphysics of Substance 191 (D. Dahlstrom ed. 1988).
10. K. Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and Political Choice (1988).
11. The beginning of this demolition is the case of Everson v. Board of Education,
330 U.S. 1, 67 S. Ct. 504 (1947).
12. See, e.g., Gedicks & Hendrix, Democracy, Autonomy and Values: Some Thoughts
on Religion and Law in Modern America, 60 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1579 (1987).
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contemporary American society. One is that the debate of recent memory
is pretty much spent. Accusations against secular humanists by fundamentalists, and by secular humanists against fundamentalists have become
tiresome, as are charges of godliness and fanaticism. Scholarly criticism
of the Supreme Court's church-state corpus has grown so caustic, and
is so widespread, that almost any new departure would be welcome.
Specifically, the jurisprudential linchpin of the liberal synthesis-the 1947
decision in Everson v. Board of Educationl3-has now been decisively
refuted by a host of scholars, 14 and only the judicial certification of its
death stands between us and a fresh start in the courts.
The post-Enlightenment world may, however, never come because
its price seems to be "separation" and therefore religious liberty. But
what if the opposite were true? What if an invigorated, taut churchstate separation was instead the new linchpin? That is the case I propose
to make by examining church autonomy in our constitutional order.
This should be the flagship issue of church and state, the litmus test
of a regime's commitment to genuine spiritual freedom, and one whose
proper basic handling is obvious in a separationist tradition. Instead it
is the least developed, most confused of our church-state analyses, both
in the law and in informed commentary, suggesting that the consensus
sequence has badly deformed our traditional commitment to separation.
My focus is on fundamentals, where mistakes engender increasingly ill
effects all the way down the analytical line. I conclude that separation
makes religious liberty possible but argue that the Judaeo-Christian
tradition makes separation possible. 5 The inversion of the popular sequence is total: to preserve religious liberty we must, in some decisive
way, keep Christianity in the public arena.

I
By "church autonomy" I mean the issue that arises when legal
principles displace religious communities' internal rules of interpersonal
relations (as opposed to prescriptions for personal spirituality). 16 The

13. 330 U.S. 1, 67 S. Ct. 504 (1947).
14. See, e.g., G. Bradley, Church-State Relationships in America (1987); R. Cord,
Separation of Church and State (1982); D. Dreisbach, Real Threat and Mere Shadow,
Religious Liberty and the First Amendment (1987).
15. Since in my view Christianity on this precise point does "consummate"-in a
completely neutral analytical sense-Judaism, I speak of the "Christian" tradition here
as including inchoate Judaistic elements.
16. More precisely, I focus on cases where there is not simply a practical convergence
of norms stemming from incommensurable motives proper to the different orders-temporal
and spiritual-in the one society. An example of such a convergence would be a legal
ban on snake-handling because it is inimical to physical health, where believers indifferent
to that risk handle snakes for spiritual benefits.
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issue was presented in three recent Supreme Court decisions, the Bob
Jones,'7 Dayton Christian Schools, 8 and (with qualification) Amos 9
cases. The Court avoided square confrontation with the same issue in
NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago,20 and in a District of Columbia
court recently Georgetown University and a gay student association
joined the issue. 2' "Church autonomy" issues, as discussed here, arise
when the polity legislates "correct" interpersonal relations, decided upon
after reflection upon intrinsic human dignity and the requisites of the
"good," "great" or "perfect" community, and these political pronouncements come into conflict with religious pronouncements on the
same subject. Of course, the attainment of a perfect is not necessarily
the raison d'etre of churches, but it is close enough to make distinguishing the two kingdoms a formidable challenge.
The conflicts that can arise are of kaleidoscopic variety, as a few
examples show. In Bob Jones, the religious community persuaded itself
that race was a salient factor in ordering some interpersonal relations
within the community, and forbade interracial dating. A flabbergasted
polity, having just reached a fragile consensus to the contrary, used its
tax laws to send a message. In Dayton Christian Schools, a religious
group decided to follow the Matthean injunction not to take wrongs to
civil courts and, more importantly, required its employees to abstain
from political courts and submit only to religious authority when disputes
arose. Elementary principles of justice in the polity again hold otherwise.
In Amos, shared religious belief provided an ordering principle in the
community's employment practices. The polity has determined that this
is generally impermissible as a violation of equal protection of the laws.
In Catholic Bishop, application of NLRB jurisdiction to parochial school
teachers would have transformed the unique relation between diocesan
ordinary and church employees. In the recent Distrist of Columbia case,
Georgetown University could not, in light .of traditional Catholic teaching, regard sexual orientation as a matter of institutional indifference.
The university feared that official recognition of the plaintiff organizations implied "endorsement" of a range of propositions hostile to
Catholic belief. The District of Columbia, however, banned such "discrimination" in "educational institutions," with no exemption for sectarian endeavors.

17. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983).
18. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 106
S. Ct. 2718 (1986).
19. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of LatterDay Saints v. Amos, 107 S. Ct. 2862 (1987).
20. 440 U.S. 490, 99 S. Ct 1313 (1977).
21. Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown Univ. Law Center v. Georgetown Univ.,
536 A.2d 1 (1987).
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This catalog of illustrations intentionally subordinates seminal cases
in the church autonomy area, starting with Watson v. Jones22 in 1871
and culminating with the 1979 decision in Jones v. Wolf. 2 "Church
autonomy" was there investigated exclusively within the context of property disputes in schismatic churches. That scenario is only loosely related
to my paradigm. 24 The conflict in property dispute/schism cases is between neutral legal principles concerning the interpretation of deeds and
trusts, and questions no less than which of the schismatic groups in the
"true" church. While the manner in which such cases are decided is
important-the effect upon religious freedom can be significant-they
portend less intellectual and political danger than the cases previously
noted.
The common thread in the cited cases is the forced introduction
into the religious community of civil "nondiscrimination" principles that
are at odds with internally generated norms. The phenomenon here
discussed is still in its adolescence. The muscular maturity of nondiscrimination still awaits us. But at the same time these norms, originating
usually in the national government, have become broader, they have
reached deeper. The Brown25 ban on segregation is just 34 years old,
and it coincided with invigorated hostility to ethnic and religious discrimination. Gender, alienage, illegitimacy, age, and handicapped status
have been banished from legitimate public consideration only within the
last generation. "Sexual preference" is now a serious contender for full
fledged enshrinement, as is marital status. The list of future candidates
is limited only by the imagination. The D.C. Human Rights Act even
added a few-"family responsibilities," "source of income"-which on
casual reading are not readily understood. 26
As if penetrating ever-smaller concentric circles, first state and local
governments, then almost all workplaces, any recipient of government
benefits, educational institutions, and every place of public accommodation succumbed to their sway. Partial proof of this state of affairs
is constitutional law's difficulty of finding any enclave outside the family
immune from this onslaught. Our celebrated "right of privacy" extends
precious little beyond the solitary individual and his "intimate" relations.
Marching steadily to meet this aggressor is an expanding religious
establishment. The Founders' church was paradigmatically the local Protestant congregation of loosely affiliated, already converted (or saved)

22. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1879).
23. 443 U.S. 595, 99 S. Ct. 1526 (1979).
24. These cases are much more like the snake handling hypothetical discussed supra
note 16.
25. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 75 S. Ct. 753 (1955).
26. The relevant portions of D.C. Code Ann. § 1-2520 (1987) are summarized in
Gay Rights Coalition, 536 A.2d at 4 n.l.
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individuals bearing a near-invisible juridical profile. These "visible saints ' 27
did not produce tightly regulated ecclesia because they did not believe
them conducive to spiritual health. This was true to an even greater
extent of the dissenting fringe inhabited by Baptists and Quakers. In
addition to the lack of religious establishment, the polity's "implicit"
Protestant establishment2" further mitigated conflict by assuring that
convergence of legal and religious norms was harmonious. Put crudely
but not incorrectly, neither the magistrate nor the pastor (and not because
they were the same person, for they were not) was prone to treat women
as they did men, or to depart from a democracy of the privileged-elect
or freeholder. Specific exemptions, perhaps for Quakers, 29 resolved the
conflicts that did emerge.
Sometime after the Civil War all this changed. A more aggressive
state confronted a host of bickering, discordant religious voices, just as
believers institutionalized their presence in educational and economic
activities. Now there is no difficulty in locating what are indisputably
full-integrated religious communities within prevailing legal definitions
of workplace, school, grant recipient, or place of public accommodation.
To illustrate this transition prosaically from a slice of constitutional law,
consider this: if either the Lochner°-era belief that employment relations
lay beyond legal regulation were accepted or if religious groups rarely
established internal relations fairly called ones of "employment," then
the problem of "church autonomy" does not present itself.
This is the array of hostile forces. Hanging over this battlefield is
an intellectual haze that fundamentally obscures the combatants' lines
and that transforms the fray into an almost undirected melee. Two
political developments contribute to the chaos. First is the longstanding
blind spot in liberal political theories concerning groups of all kinds.
Liberalism adeptly reasons about the individual and the state, but cannot
fathom groups. Second is the increasing attraction of what is hard to
label "liberal," "conservative" or otherwise: the seductive invitation to
"national community." This invitation is contained in the call of Democratic politicians to establish a national "family" or to practice the
politics of "compassion"; in communitarian political philosophy and in
constitutional law, especially by Critical Legal Studies devotees; and
maybe the inevitable if unintended consequence of modernity. If we
speak intelligently of a global village, the nation as family is rhetorically
inevitable.

27. See E. Morgan, Visible Saints: The History of a Puritan Idea (1963).
28. See G. Bradley, supra note 14, at 121-31.
29. During the early national period Quakers were frequently exempted from bearing
arms and from taking oaths, both duties required of other citizens.
30. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 25 S. Ct. 539 (1905).
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The common effect is a runaway moral inflation of interpersonal
relations in the polity. Integral to that inflation is a greater affinity
between the premises of political reflection and those of interpersonal
morality as such. Add the felt importance (for whatever reason or cause)
of extending these politically derived norms to traditionally nonpolitical
arenas, and the sum is an undifferentiated "justice" presuming relevance
to the internal order of churches. The ironic result is nothing less than
coercive evangelism. Finally, while the regime increasingly orders personal
relations in the ever-ballooning public sphere, it denounces application
of any objective norm at all to "private" relationships. That is the area
of unbounded expression of individual subjectivity. Hence, churches
teaching traditional sexual morality, for example, appear as authoritarian
antiques propounding intrinsically improbable laws.
This approach is not limited to politics; there has been a corresponding expansion of the religious arena. Misrepresenting the next point
is easy, so with caution I repeat what has become something of a cliche:
the churches are increasingly "politicized." By that I mean they imitate
political thinking about order. The political enthusiast and the church
activist, it seems to me, agree that little in life is not political, and
reason from common premises about common problems.
Risking too fine a spin to it, there are again two constituent elements
of "politicized" religion. The first is the reduction of intrachurch relations to ones of "power" by (among others) feminist critics of patriarchal churches. The second is the powerful influence within Christian
churches of "public theology," 3 the insistence that religion is just one
aspect of philosophical reflection and that common anthropological roots
link it to other ostensibly nonreligious speculative enterprises. The joint
effect of these trends is to extend the religious hand, so to speak, to
meet the equally eager grasp of the reflective political operative. I concede
that public theology may suggest an eventual return to the harmonies
wrought by the implicit Protestant establishment: political and religious
reflection might some day again coincide. But the short term effect is
another thing. For now, the uneven absorption of public theology pits
"traditionalists" and "modernists" against each other within churches,
engendering conflicts that summon legal intervention.
Stir into this cauldron of considerations the general litigiousness of
our society-if something makes you say "ouch" you need a lawyerand you have an open invitation to the courts. Judges have not demurred.
Since the 1947 Everson 2 decision they have decided for various reasons,
articulated or not, that the political process is unable to adjust religious

31. See the excellent review discussion in Placher, Revisionist and Postliberal Theologies and the Public Character of Theology, 49 Thonist 392 (1985).
32. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 67 S. Ct. 504 (1947).
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conflict, and that courts can and should be the all-purpose umpire. In
the give-and-take, ad hoc legislative process, clear thinking is a luxury
that may tolerably be foregone. By contrast, where courts decide principled analysis is required. Thus, the "judicialization" of church-state
means we must think clearly about the problem.
We have not done so. Consider some examples of the confusion
gathered from recent Supreme Court lore. Amos3 is the opener. In that
1987 case, a Mormon-owned gymnasium, whose operations were not
"religious," discharged Amos for failing to qualify as a Church member.
He then challenged the exemption of '.'religious" entities from a federal
ban on employment discrimination on religious grounds. Amos contended
that any reading of the exemption shielding the Mormon defendants
from liability violated the Establishment Clause.
Amos lost, but it is hard to conclude that religion won, although
the muddy, inconclusive opinions of the Justices make conjecture most
risky. For one thing, Amos established no defense whatsoever to a
hostile takeover of the field by a statute, and thus articulated no constitutional doctrine of "church autonomy." The majority opinion does
seem to contemplate some constitutionally mandated (by Free Exercise,
presumably) "noninterference" in religious practices, but neither in Amos
nor in any other case has the Court squarely held that religious organizations possess constitutional rights. The strongest hint of breakthrough
in Amos comes in the Brennan-Marshall concurrence, which recognized
religious organizations have an "interest in autonomy in ordering their
internal affairs." But the only warrant adduced for that proposition
was a law review article by Professor Laycock1 4 The concurrence cautiously concluded:
The authority to engage in this process of self-definition inevitably involves what we normally regard as infringement on Free
Exercise rights, since a religious organization is able to condition
employment in certain activities on subscription to particular
religious tenets. We are willing to countenance the imposition
of such a condition because we deem it vital that, if certain
activities constitute part of a religious community's practice,
then a religious organization should be able to require that only
members of its community perform those activities.35
Notwithstanding these encouraging signals, Brennan and Marshall
never quite convince themselves that churches are more than aggregates

33. 107 S. Ct. 2862 (1987).
34. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of LatterDay Saints v. Amos, 107 S. Ct. 2862, 2872 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting
Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor
Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 1373, 1389 (1981)).
35. Amos, 107 S. Ct. at 2872 (Brennan, J.,concurring).
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of individuals or that churches may possess rights apart from those of
individual members. For them, churches are simultaneously grounded in
and potential enemies of what is securely founded: individual freedom
of conscience. The tail that wags this dog is their inability to break
free of the liberal philosophical poles of individual and state. This
imprisonment is evident in their statement that deference to group concerns "permits infringement on employee Free Exercise rights." '3 6 The
case presents no Free Exercise claim of individuals. No one has a
constitutional right, most especially regarding a religious employer, to
a private sector job on nondiscriminatory grounds. Only a statute, Title
VII, raises such a possibility, not the Constitution. The same modern
individual liberalism is evident in the following conclusion:
Sensitivity to individual religious freedom dictates that religious
discrimination be permitted only with respect to employment in
religious activities. Concern for the autonomy of religious organizations demands that we avoid the entanglement and the
chill on religious expression that a case-by-case determination
would produce. We cannot escape the fact that these aims are
in tension. Because of the nature of nonprofit activities, I believe
that a categorical exemption for such enterprises appropriately
37
balances these competing concerns.
What is truly remarkable about the Amos case is that there is an
Amos case at all. How did we arrive at a point where Congress may
(or may not) "grant" church autonomy, and where a court seriously
considers whether Congress "establishes" religion if it does? One must
not be lulled by the majority's glib reassurances. The Amos plaintiff
did indeed identify a potent constitutional impediment to the legislative
exemptions. Under prevailing doctrine, Amos is a much closer case than
the majority admits. Brennan and Marshall saw that, as did Justice
O'Connor. She recognized that the relevant exemptions for church autonomy may well violate the Constitution, at least as now judicially
interpreted:
On the one hand, a rigid application of the Lemon test would
invalidate legislation exempting religious observers from generally
applicable government obligations. By definition, such legislation
has a religious purpose and effect in promoting the free exercise
of religion. On the other hand, judicial deference to all legislation
that purports to facilitate the free exercise of religion would
completely vitiate the Establishment Clause. Any statute per-

36.
37.

Id. at 2873 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Id.
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Remember too that Amos is virtually the most powerful case imaginable of church autonomy: a religious community making belief a litmus
for membership is the stem from which the ancillary protection of
community integrity in Amos follows.
Amos is not the most troubling Supreme Court foray into church
autonomy of the Eighties; Bob Jones9 is. The trouble there was not
the confusion evident in Amos. The court in Bob Jones is quite sure
of where it wants to go, and it allows nothing to obstruct its journey
there. Nor is Bob Jones opaque, as Amos was. The central teaching of
the Bob Jones case is quite clear, and leaves only the question whether
its burial of church autonomy was decent enough. Yet with the notable
exception of the late Bob Cover, 4° very few nonevangelicals have criticized
the Court's decision. Among those arrayed against Bob Jones University
were the mainline churches, whose commitment to racial equality evidently either outweighed their instinct for survival or overcame their
ability to discern what was at stake.
The Court did concede that sincere Biblical exegesis underlay the
university's prohibition of interracial dating and marriage. A composite
institutional portrait revealed:
a religious and educational institution [whose] teachers are required to be devout Christians, and all courses at the University
are taught according to the Bible. Entering students are screened
as to their religious beliefs, and their public and private conduct
is strictly regulated by standards promulgated by University au4
thorities. '
In other words the university, in its own misguided way, was seriously
trying to live the life of the Kingdom, to taste the world to come. From
this profile it is easy to see that the only question in the case is whether
this community's order should conform to "public policy," for there
were lots of regulations (besides those about interracial fraternizing) that
could never be legitimately adopted by a politically organized community
in this country. Once critical comparison between Bob Jones University
and the polity is undertaken, the university is a goner.

38. Id. at 2874 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting from Wallace
v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 82, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2504 (1985)).
39. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983).
46. See Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative,
97 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (1983). A fuller analysis of Bob Jones appears in G. Bradley, supra
note 14, from which the present discussion is adapted.
41. Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 580, 103 S. Ct. at 2022.
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So it was. The Court went out of its way to conclude that "the
purpose" of a tax-exempt entity may not be illegal or contrary to public
42
(Query: Was it the "purpose" of Bob Jones University to
policy.
forbid interracial dating?) This reworking of the statute so that it approximated "exempt status for religious organizations bereft of tenets
contrary to public policy" easily placed the University outside the exempt
class. The University fell back from this statutory defeat to a consti43
tutional defense, which the Court immediately treated as a Yoder /
45
Thomas"I/Sherbert individual conduct exemption. At first, the Court
wondered on whether the University was "burdened" by the denial of
tax-exempt status, observing that denial of benefits would have a "substantial impact" upon religious schools, but "would not prevent those
schools from observing their religious tenets." Relenting on that, they
had no trouble adducing the necessary "compelling state interest" and
figuring the absence of "less restrictive means," which is not surprising
because the majority had already expended pages establishing the urgency
of ending "racial discrimination" in education. 6
Several questions are engendered by Bob Jones. In what sense is
"subsidization" of only state-approved faiths "neutral," and how is
that not an accurate account of Bob Jones? If Bob Jones University
loses because it forbids adherents to marry outside their race, what of
Catholic seminarians who are forbidden to marry anyone at all? For
that matter, how can Catholic schools retain tax-exempt status so long
as the church refuses to ordain women, and teaches the objective sinfulness of contraception? Are not "gender equality" and "privacy"
overriding public policies? How is the autocratic polity of hierarchical
churches squared with the fundamental constitutional principle of "oneman, one-vote"? While we may be accustomed to Congress playing
"carrot-and-stick" with the states and economic actors, constitutional
authority to treat religious institutions so hardly follows.
A bewildering footnote reveals the Court's awareness of this: "We
deal here only with religious schools-not with churches or other purely
religious institutions; here the governmental interest is in denying public
support to racial discrimination in education. '47 But the Court is es-

42.
43.
44.

Id. at 586-99, 103 S. Ct. at 2025-32.
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 92 S. Ct. 1526 (1972).
Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Empl. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 101 S. Ct.

1425 (1981).

45. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S. Ct. 1790 (1963).
46. Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 592-604, 103 S. Ct. at 2028-35. Do not assume that
racial discrimination is here sui generis. The Georgetown court concluded that the District
of Columbia had a "compelling interest" in banning discrimination on grounds of "sexual
orientation."
47. Id. at 604, 103 S. Ct. at 2035 n.29.
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topped from saying that "religious schools" have no Free Exercise
protection. If they don't, why does the text so carefully refute the
"conduct exemption" claim? "Public support" too is an analytical
diversion. If Walz v. Tax Commission48 allowed tax exemptions for
religious institutions, a fortiori, the public supports institutions "contrary
to public policy" in the Bob Jones sense, and contrary to their own
individual sensibilities. The balance of the footnote simply confirms the
suspicion that churches must observe public orthodoxy. If an entirely
intracommunal, faith-inspired discipline is supposed to mimic constitutional norms, to what "autonomy" should religious institutions aspire?
Why is the result in Bob Jones not precisely the "corrosive secularism"the imperious penetration of the private sphere by alien public influences-that the Court elsewhere fears on religion's behalf? "Corrosive
secularism" is apparently, after Bob Jones, a claim that stems the flow
of religious currents into the public sphere, but does not slow the
incursion of political norms into the private realm.
Why all the excitement about Bob Jones? After all, how can the
tax laws underwrite racial discrimination at this point in our history?
This is a fair observation, and if the Court had conceded that Bob
Jones could fend off an outright ban on racial discrimination, I would
back off a bit. But little in the opinion supports that reassurance, and
what is there is fundamentally troubling. The blithe presumption that
once a principle assumes the status of self-evident truth in the political
realm (and really, racial equality is still a relative youngster, and interracial marriages were declared constitutionally protected only in 196749)
a religious community out of step is desperately on the defensive. The
presumption should be the opposite. The fact that a church is out-ofstep with the state is, by itself, an unremarkable observation. There
should be no expectation, least of all a glib one, that the writ of public
policy should run so far into the churches.
The cases the Court sidestepped in Bob Jones by focusing on the
Yonder! Thomas/Sherbert line dated from the 1871 Watson v. Jones5 °
holding. Watson required judicial abstention on "internal ecclesiastic
disputes" over faith, doctrine, discipline, and church polity. "The law
knows no heresy, and is committed to the support- of no dogma."'"
(Note the implicit "Christian-ness": many faiths, Judaism included, are
not creedal and hardly permit the notion of "heresy.") To be sure,
there was no schism at Bob Jones University. In fact, there was no
evidence that anyone at the university objected to its policies. That is

48.
49.
50.
51.

397 U.S. 664, 90 S. Ct 1409 (1970).
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1817 (1967).
Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
Id. at 728.
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the trouble. It may be that the Bob Jones Court believes that this
"church autonomy" doctrine, such as it is, is unavailable in defenses
against the regulatory power of the state. If so, we can reliably whittle
down the available constitutional shields to those presently examined.
That indeed seems the practical effect of Jones v. Wolf," the latest
comment on Watson. Courts are now invited to apply "neutral legal
principles" where church autonomy is at stake. The problem with that
is that the state will always win. By definition, where legislation threatens
the religious community there is a "neutral" legal principle available.
What other constitutional home beckons to "church autonomy?"
There is a "flip-side" of the second Lemon prong." Legislation must
not advance religion but (at least the ritual incantation holds) must not
inhibit it either. This is no help. After forty-plus years and many cases,
no Supreme Court (and few, if any, lower court) decisions have rested
on this "no inhibition" prong. That is partially due to its analytical
superfluity: it adds nothing of consequence to what is usually associated
with Free Exercise. This may be largely true, but its truth owes to the
immaturity of the entire corpus. That is, the Establishment Clause is
more clearly attuned to institutional and group relationships with the
polity, and invigoration of "no inhibition" to protect church autonomy
seems more logical than its relegation to an inhospitable Free Exercise
Clause.
Still another Lemon inquiry seems intended to prevent precisely the4
erosion of church autonomy: the third, "no entanglements" inquiry.
For reasons discussed in connection with the Bob Jones case, this inquiry
too is of little use. Factor in that the inquiry inescapably is one of
degree, and one sees that a Court insensitive to the nature of churchstate separation will do little good with it.
That same difficulty afflicts Free Exercise analysis. Where the free
exercise of religion is abridged by state action (and we will assume that
is true of the scenarios examined here) the state can win (by displacing
the religious community's norms) only if the incursion is the least
restrictive means of accomplishing a compelling state interest. 5 That
traditionally has been a high hurdle, but the Court has recently lowered
its height even in its home context of individual exemptions.16 The short
story is this: when all is said and done this is a familiar balancing test.
Hence the test is only as solicitous of church autonomy as the education,
sensitivity and open-mindedness of the testers-the judiciary. That's the

52. 443 U.S. 595, 99 S. Ct. 3020 (1979).
53. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S 602, 91 S. Ct. 2105 (1971).
54. Id. at 613, 91 S. Ct. at 2111.
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 106 S. Ct. 2147 (1986); Goldman v.
Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 106 S. Ct. 1310 (1986).
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good news. The bad news is that the analysis does not begin on a level
playing surface. Virtually all the distorting intellectual and political currents previously described are at play here.
The analysis is imported from the field of individual relation to
coercive state power. When transported to church autonomy, however,
the church is analogized to the state because it possesses the "coercive"
power, and a bias against the church immediately arises. In Amos and
Dayton Christian Schools, an individual plaintiff armed with a nondiscrimination principle already championed by the judiciary confronted
the church. Sympathy for this lonely dissenter is heightened by the
prevailing placement of religion in the "private" sphere of endeavor
where, according to modern liberal theory, authoritatively articulated
"norms" are inherently suspect. The overriding goal of all church-state
jurisprudence since Everson-individual freedom to "choose" beliefs and
to authentically guide one's own spiritual life' 7-seals the fate of church
autonomy. This analytical edifice obscures the liberty-enhancing virtues
of the autonomy of the church as an institution, not least its historically
pivotal role in guarding against political absolutism. In other words, we
are caught in the familiar liberal trap: individual autonomy equals liberty.
Authority takes liberty away. These forces play a zero-sum game. If
you favor "liberty," you want individuals to prevail.
Here we have little more than the elementary logic of modern liberal
individualism or "autonomy." This autonomy is the individual human
being's capacity to determine its self, to create and master its identity
through unconstrained, authentic individual choices. Obviously, individuals in relations of subordination or domination (defined in liberal
thought as insufficient autonomy) do not possess this capacity, and the
liberal state characteristically stands ready to put them in possession.
That situation is characteristic of, for example, the traditional family
and organized religion, most particularly in hierarchically-structured
churches. So, unless or until liberalism incorporates some decisive limiting
principle on its service as guarantor of autonomy, churches are defenseless against its depredations under the autonomy flag.
The- problem is that liberalism does not have and cannot develop
such a limiting principle. Its analytical field is constituted by the solitary
subject confronting a mass of other individual subjects, all looking to
the state for protection of maximum feasible self-mastery. All extraindividual existence is in a competitive field of power relations. Church
autonomy is thereby obliterated because churches characteristically eschew power relations in their self-understanding. Christian churches have

57. If this point seems less self-evident, warrants for it can be found in Bradley,
Dogmatochamy-A "Privatization" Theory of the Religion Clause Cases, 30 St. Louis
U.L.J. 275, 311-12 (1986).

1989]

FORUM JURIDICUM

traditionally preached dispositions like obedience, service, and kenosis
(emptying of self) as their rules for church fellowship. Such notions
contribute to communion, and are rooted in the common New Testament
idea of Christians possessing one spiritual substance in Jesus, with
resulting corporate images like Paul's "Mystical Body" and John's vine
and branches."' Obviously, where teachings like "the last shall be first"
are taken seriously (as in Christianity) the liberal quest for self-mastery
in a field of power relations is inapposite, to say the least. It should
not be surprising then that a liberal constitutional theorist like Laurence
Tribe, in the course of a 147-page treatment of the rights of "religious
autonomy" 5 9 has no, repeat, no, tools at hand to cope with a cases
like Catholic Bishop, and Dayton Christian Schools. He literally ignores
them. They are invisible on his analytical screenA0
II
How do we reset an analysis so badly and so dangerously deformed
by liberalism? One way is to recover what "separation of church and
state" means. It symbolizes the permanent tension in Western societies
between the exigencies of pragmatic existence in history and the consciousness of divine order arising in men's souls. 61 The reality so constituted is, most precisely, a field of tension bordered by two pulls,
denoted "world" and "divine." It occurs in individuals who, when they
form a cultural matrix, channel the tension into two authorities within
their society: spiritual and temporal. This is the "core" of what we call
church and state.
One way to momentarily glimpse both the distinction and the tension
between these two authorities is to recall the origins of a movement
that produced well-known victories for religious liberty in the Supreme
Court, the Seventh Day Adventists. This group traces its origins to
William Miller, a self-educated veteran of the War of 1812.62 Miller
attracted a substantial following due solely to the precision of his prophecy: the world would end sometime in 1843. Subsequent fine-tuning
produced and exact forecast: October 22, 1844 was the "end time."

58. See R. Brown, The Gospel According to John (XIII-XXI) 670 (1970).
59. L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 1154-1301 (2d. ed 1988).
60. For a fuller critique-and support for the proposition in the test-see Bradley,
A Gracious Passage to Oakland: Tribe's "Jurisprudence of the Religion Clauses," in The
Jurisprudence of Laurence Tribe (forthcoming, G. McDowell ed. 1989).
61. This approximate formulation was suggested to me by the work of Eric Voegelin.
See, e.g., E. Voegelin, 1 Israel and Revelation 182-83 (1956) [hereinafter E. Voegelin,
Israel] and E. Voegelin, The New Science of Politics chs. 3 & 4 (1952) [hereinafter E.
Voegelin, The New Science].
62. See generally Dick, The Millerite Movement 1830-1845, in Adventism in America
1-35 (G. Land ed. 1986).
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Faithful "Millerites" were thus privileged to exemplify life lived at the
edge of judgment, and they did so with zealoussness.
Historian Everett N. Dick describes the penultimate days:
As the 22d of October approached, people prepared to leave
the world bodily, just as someone going on a long trip gets his
business affairs in order ....
Newspapers of the day record that
banks, the United States Treasury, and other financial agencies
received large amounts of money from those who had defrauded
creditors. A reporter for the PHILADELPHIA PUBLIC LEGER
noticed the following in the window of I. T. Hough, the tailor,
on Fifth Street. "This shop is closed in honor of the King of
Kings, who will appear about the 22nd of October. Get ready,
friends, to crown him Lord of all. . . ." The urgency of preparation is indicated by the following notice: "If any human
being has a just pecunicary claim against me, he is requested
to inform me instantly. N. Soughard." An eyewitness described
the meeting of the believers at Rochester, New York, on October
22, the day of expectation. The day dawned bright and clear,
and believers came to the meeting place early and continued to
pray and testify of their faith. Speakers used such phrases as
"last hours of time," "last moments of time," "we're living
on the brink of eternity." The day dragged on slowly-to noon,
to sunset to midnight. Finally, daybreak of October 23 came
as on any other day, and the worshipers went home, worn out
63
and bitterly disappointed.
Imagine yourself carrying around the intensity of Millerite expectation at the same time that you take this world with utmost gravity.
Familiar formulations of that effect include statements that believers
should be "in" the world but not "of" it; that they live "between the
times," in the "already but not yet"; that life is a "sojourn" or
"pilgrimage"; that ultimately "the last shall be first, and the first last";
that one gains life by dying; and that "the meek shall inherit the earth."
Millennialists help us appreciate the pull toward perfection in the beyond
and they do so by singularly concentrating, and reflecting, the divine
chord.
My claim is both a philosophical and a historical one: apart from
the differentiated experience "church-state," as an irreducible and unique
element of our common life, does not exist. Put differently, "church
and state" is an idea rooted in a particular cultural matrix, a matrix
itself comprised of underlying experiences socially transmitted and constitutive of a political community through effective, commonly-accessible

63.

Id.at 29.
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symbolization. Like all ideas, torn from its proper environment it loses
its meaning and capacity to illumine.
The dilemma symbolized by "church and state" is a "problematic,"
a difficulty or challenge that summons a response. It is not fairly styled
a "problem" because that commits one to a response, usually called a
"solution." But "solution" is impossible. "Response" means proper
management, coping as well as can be expected given the nature of the
difficulty. Sustaining existence within the field of tension while avoiding
the temptation to eradicate dissonance by migrating to one or the other
pole qualifies as "success." Within that range of effective management
is a variety of possibilities, and one possibility may work now but not
later. That which worked before may now be inadequate, or dangerous.
This is one reason to resist all attempts to work a "constitutional
philosophy" of religion and to criticize the effective "judicialization"
(the comprehensive management of the church-state problematic by courts)
wrought by Everson.
The observations previewed early on now bear fuller repetition: we
constitutionalists are not constructively engaging the church-state issue
and have practically obliterated it. More exactly, either by neglect or
by design "church-state" has become opaque. It is no longer transparent
for the underlying experience apart from which the term is both meaningless and useless, either because it has lost all meaning, or because
it is an empty vessel into which one pours whatever meaning is desired.
Now, in this time of acute hermeneutical consciousness in the law,
especially that of the Constitution, claiming that a term (like "separation
of church and state") is meaningful only in context is hardly novel.
"Separation" might mean simply prohibiting clerics from serving in
political office, or it might mean a "naked public square," depending
upon its context. As John Noonan rightly observes,
"Church and State" . . . is a profoundly misleading rubric. The
title triply misleads. It suggests that there is a single church.
But in America there are myriad ways in which religious belief
is organized. It suggests that there is a single state. But in
America there is the federal government, fifty state governments,
myriad municipalities, and a division of power among executive,
legislative, administrative, and judicial entities, each of whom
embodies state power. Worst of all, "Church and State" suggests
that there are two distinct bodies set apart from each other in
contrast if not in conflict. But everywhere neither churches nor
states exist except as they are incorporated in actual individuals.
These individuals are believers and unbelievers, citizens and officials. In one aspect of their activities, if they are religious,
they usually form churches. In another aspect they form governments. Religious and governmental bodies not only coexist
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but overlap. The same persons, much of the time, are both
believers and wielder of power. 64
All meaning is contextual, but my main point here is a bit more
subtle. Apart from the meaning I am describing, "separation" (as far
as I can tell) has no distinctive meaning. Other circulating "meanings"
either trivalize it, or subsume it within broader concerns that then
determine the meaning of "separation." In either event "separation"
retains no irreducible, unique meaning. I submit that given its prominence
in the Western tradition up to the moment, a distinctive (that is, an
irreducible and unique) meaning has a claim to priority in our constitutional order.
The so-called "New Age" spirituality is an example of a trivializing
meanings. Much of this is an eclectic mix of eastern mystical practice,
occultism, speculative fancy and other less attractive elements. The compound then frequently ends by detaching religion entirely from the
material world, so that "religion" is some fantastic voyage inward and
upward that leaves untouched the increasingly routinized series of function-driven performances that make up our daily lives. If religion does
not inform one's actions, then it has no effect on one's politics. In this
context, "separation" (whatever its meaning) is superfluous because there
is no urge toward integration.
Examples of subsuming meanings abound. Liberalism obviously joins
the whole problem of religion to that of individual autonomy, so that
the former is at best an aspect or accent of the latter. The reduction
of religion either to a plan for transforming the world or to a recipe
for psychological well-being is common in our Christian churches today.
Given its attraction for the Tillichian notion of religion as "ultimate
concern," the Supreme Court has predictably defaced the tradition by
not requiring a divine element in constitutionally cognizable religion.
(No doubt the engine behind that move was some mix or liberal notions
of "equality" and "autonomy.") Churches are also increasingly treated
in legal reflection as simply "voluntary associations," as if the Jaycees
and the Roman Catholic Church were analytically fungible entities. In
all these instances the church-state problematic is deformed by a decisive
turning away from the divine pull.
Another exaggeration of the mundane pull is typically perpetrated
by a conservative concern for order. I submit that deforming statist
premises are introduced wherever "church and state" is spoken of as
if the symbol's meaning was exhausted by identifying religion's contribution to social stability, even by its contribution to limited government.
I am not denying that religion ordinarily does these things or contains

64. J. Noonan, The Believer and the Powers That Are: Cases, History, and Other
Data Bearing on the Relations of Religion and Government xvi (1987).
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some of these elements. Nor am I saying that religion should not
contribute to limited government. It does and that is good. I am saying
that so long as we do not insist that the primary meaning is none of
these current explanations, and beyond all of them, we will lose the
distinctive meaning of the symbol.
That insistence has been noticeably absent, and here I summon
testimony to that absence. Kent Greenawalt has said, 65 "Many law
professors, like other intellectuals, display a . . . disguised contempt for
belief in any reality beyond that discoverable by scientific inquiry and
ordinary human experience. [These people] regard religious convictions
as foolish superstition. . . ." Rex Lee writes, 66 "[T]here has been a
reluctance . . . by legal educators with religious convictions to acknowledge anything other than a hermetically sealed relationship between their67
faith and what they teach." Fred Gedicks and Roger Hendricks argue,
"As religious language disappears from law, politics, and American
public life in general ....
it will not be long before we become incapable
of describing ourselves in such terms, even privately, at which point we
will no longer be religious." Since what we call "church-state" arises
and can only be discussed within an intellectual field that presupposes
religious, particularly Christian concepts, the testimony suggests that we
cannot talk about church-state in the present environment. It should
already be clear that no one in a "naked public square" can talk about
separation of church and state.
What is the proper context, and what meaning does it bestow? It
is routinely though not widely remarked in the nonlegal literature that
Christianity, as a historical fact, causes or gives rise to the church-state
problematic. That is, I think, basically true. By "basically" I mean that
the main trajectory of Christianity since the post-apostolic era exhibits
the problematic, while it is difficult or impossible to detect elsewhere.
The reason for that hypothesis starts with historical situations not measurably penetrated by Christianity, and with noting whether, and why,
the church-state problematic is there unobserved. In most such situations
there is no church-state difficulty or conflict. This is not because the
problematic has been "solved"; it is because the problematic does not
exist. The necessary experience or required verbal symbols-or bothbeing absent, speaking of "church and state" is literally impossible.
The distinction between such cultures and one with a Christian matrix
is made apparent in Shirley Jackson Case's depiction of life in such an
environment:

65.
(1985).
66.

Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and Lawmaking, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 352, 356
Lee, The Role of the Religious Law School, 30 Vill. L. Rev. 1175, 1187 (1985).

67. Gedick & Hendrix, supra note 12, at 1609.
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The sky hung low in the ancient world. Traffic was heavy on
the highway between heaven and earth. Gods and spirits thickly
populated the upper air, where they stood in readiness to intervene at any moment in the affairs of mortals. Any demonic
powers, emerging from the lower world or resident in remote
corners of the earth, were a constant menace to human welfare.
68
All nature was alive-alive with supernatural forces.
While a complete treatment of this problem would have to examine
all the major world religions, examples here must be limited and accessible. "Animism" and "paganism" are religious systems still claiming
adherents, even if only occasionally are they socially decisive. "Paganism" is perhaps the better known term. While colloquially it designates
a crude unbeliever, an atheist lacking table manners, historically "pagans" were believers. They believed in what Christians called the religion
of the Greeks and Romans, which is best rendered as "polytheism," a
plurality of gods. "Animism" is technically the attribution of consciousness and (usually) spiritual powers to innominate things and verges
on paganism in generating a multitude of "gods" or "spirits," each
deserving some part of human spiritual attention. A contemporary example of practical fusion is the Native American religion increasingly
encountered in church-state litigation. In Bowen v. Roy, 69 for instance,
a Native American said that her "spirit" was diminished by assigning
her a social security number. While accommodation of a lone litigant's
spiritual needs may politically be the preferred course, the Supreme
Court in Bowen properly sought a principled resolution of her claim.
The plaintiff lost her case, in an opinion that generally weakened
the protection of conscientious objectors. The Court did not say as
much, but I think (a thought supported by the most recent Indian belief
0
case, Lyng v. Northwest Indiana Cemeter Protection Association"
) that
the perceived impossibility of sustaining our regime in an analytical
matrix determined by native American belief caused a reevaluation of
earlier, sweeping statements on religious liberty. "Spiritual liberty" where
Indian spirituality prevails is incompatible with the existence of a secular
state: Bowen makes clear that the spirit and the state cannot simultaneously roam where they will.
The three dissenters in Lyng frankly recognized this, even as they
supported the Native American claim. They noted that for Native Americans, religion cannot be distinguished from the social, cultural, political,
and other aspects of Indian life. That is because nature (unlike in other

68. S. Case, The Origins of Christian Supernaturalism 1 (1946) (quoted in J. Pelikan,
The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition (100-600) 132 (1971)).
69. 476 U.S. 693, 106 S. Ct. 2147 (1986).
70. 108 S. Ct. 1319 (1988).
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Western systems) does not possess an intrinsic, regular order discoverable
through scientific investigation but instead calls man to participate in
an ongoing process of Creation. This approach to experience holds that
"land, like all other living things, is unique and specific sites possess
different spiritual properties and significance." ' 7 1 It is easy to agree with
the dissenters that radically different categories are at work here, although by contrasting "Western" with Indian they betray a slippery
grip on the priority of habitation in this hemisphere. But neither the
dissenters nor the majority quite draw the inevitable conclusion: the
contrast (at a minimum) is to Western monotheism, particularly Christianity, which provides the "categories" that make "separation of church
and state" not just desirable, but thinkable. The opinion really says
that religious freedom as we know it is (unsurprisingly) drawn from
that same set of categories.
People in the ancient world, where such beliefs were the rule rather
than, the exception, would have a very hard time distinguishing the
"sacred" from the "profane," and therefore the "world" from the
"divine." Christians of the same era believed in miracles and in demonic
possession curable by exorcism. Many now .suggest that these were
outmoded pagan encrustations that Christianity picked up from its incubating environment. Certainly exorcisms are rare and miracles in preciously short supply. Nevertheless, early Christianity did decisively
distinguish itself from animism and paganism. For pagans, there is no
pull toward the transcendant. Instead there is the practical problem of
propitiating and thereby manipulating the various gods and supernatural
forces. Technique, not tension, describes the believer's world situation,
and mastery of "spiritual" methods results not only-or even primarilyin "eternal life" but in pragmatic success. More, pragmatic success is
undivorceable, and perhaps indistinguishable, from spiritual perfection.
Mundane events of all sort are thought controlled by various gods or
manipulable spiritual forces. Here it helps to compare favorably paganism and animism with modern occultism and spiritualism, including
astrology. Indeed, the sky is very low in the seance room, a space
teeming with invisible beings and spirits awaiting the call of the adept.
In this kind of system, there are not two pulls at all, but one
daunting task of correctly aligning the plural forces that sustain the
universe. There can, in principle, be no "secular" state, content to carry
on its business and "let the spirit roam where it wills." ' 72 Since the
spirits determine temporal events, the political realm is fully divinized
and only the foolish governor fails to establish official gods. Christians'
refusal to regard theirs as just one of many gods officially worshipped

71.
72.

Id. at 1331 (emphasis added).
John 3:8.
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by Rome-that is, its monotheism, as opposed to henotheism-led to
their persecution. The spiritual insight amounted to political sedition
where, as in pagan Rome, imperial fortunes were inseparable from divine
service.
The earliest Christians were conscious of the divine pull, but E. P.
Sanders persuasively argues in his Jesus and Judiasim73 that the pull
took on the form (and much of the substance) of Jewish restoration
"eschatology" (speculation about the end of time or ultimate purpose
of history). The apostolic communities lived eschatologically, in accord
with Jesus' assurance that some of his own generation would live to
see the Second Coming, or "Parousia." Hence, the early church muted
the tension (or did not experience its fullness) because of assurances
that the entire present age would soon pass. The causes and concerns
of worldly existence itself, much more the worries of politics, melt away
as ice on a summer noon as the gathered faithful eagerly await the
end. Thus, first century Christians exhibited an indifference to political
arrangements, a disinterest evident in the Pauline teaching of submissiveness to temporal authority. This was not because of some kind of.
"conservative" political stance but rather because of the Christian view
that the state was, in itself "valueless," for an eschatological community
needs only to avoid outright prosecution. It is behooved to accept the
constraints upon the flesh imposed by the "principalities and powers"
of this world (regarded by Paul as alien to the real concerns of believers),
which cannot, after all, separate Christians from the love of God that
would soon be theirs in eternity.
As the Millerites would no doubt attest, where The End is soon
expected, political authority need only be kept at bay. There is also no
need for a "church," or any other organization to sustain the spiritual
life or to transmit the saving news. But sometime soon after the second
century dawned, the early Christians experienced the realization that was
relived by the Millerites on October 23, 1844. Whenever or wherever
the realization of a postponed parousia crept in, the question of "church"
arose. This phenomenon is called "early catholicism" in biblical scholarship and denotes the early Christians' recognition, evidenced already
in sacred scripture (Matthew's gospel prominently is assertedly an example) that some institutionalization of their religion was essential to
historical transmission of the Gospel. Of this transition from living in
imminent eschatological expectation to living as church in the world,
Eric Voegelin wrote:
[A] historical society can indeed derive little hope of survival
from a religious attitude based on the assumption that the world
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will end tomorrow and that social order is therefore entirely
irrelevant. If there were no more to Christianity than this radical
eschatological expectation, it would never have become a power
in history; the Christian communities would have remained obscure sects which could always be wiped out in the event that
their foolishness seriously threatened the order of the state....
Christianity became historically effective through the Pauline
compromises, one of which concerned the order of the worldnot only the order of the state but the very being of the world,
a world which will not end next week; the other concerned the
transformation of the faithful living in eschatological expectation
into the historical corpus Christi mysticum. these compromises
were not an arbitrary addition; they were definitely implied as
a possible evolution in the appearance and the teachings of
74
Christ .
The Church, and not the Kingdom, emerged after the Resurrection.
Christian orthodoxy insists that the essence of Jesus' message was a
spiritualized version of Old Testament prophecy, that the "Kingdom"
refers to the union with God in grace after death. Orthodoxy further
insists that "origins" obscured "essence" and suggests that the tension
was muted by a cultural overlay.
We may better appreciate the Christian insight by locating it within
the broader tradition of Western monotheism. The growth of Christianity
from Judaism is most obvious in the common elements of Sacred Scripture. Less well-known is the familial tie of Islam to Judaism and
Christianity. Muslims deny Jesus' divinity but accord him prophetic
status, and retain some other Christian influences. Islam's relationship
to Judaism is different and really much closer; one commentator even
brands the two faiths "structurally akin." 75 The faiths of Abraham and
Mohammed both posit a God who is rather remote and hidden from
men, one not made accessible by the revelation that Christians believe
occurred in Jesus. This God is served on earth primarily (but far from
exclusively) by righteous conduct. "Righteousness" is a function of
revealed "law," which covers both public and private affairs. The Law
includes rules for purely personal conduct (dress, diet, piety), interpersonal relations (effectively an ethics), and state action. For Jews the
law is "Halakha"; for Muslims "Shari'a." The emphasis upon legal
observance works a convergence in priestly roles. The liturgical and
sacremental life carried on by a Christian clergy dispensing grace is, in
Judaism and Islam, replaced by a predominantly teaching function exemplified by the Jewish rabbi.
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One may now appreciate at a glance how-or why-there is not
sacred-secular distinction in Muslim societies organized by Shari'a. Daniel
Pipes elaborates upon this "relaxing" effect of law:
Islam, unlike Christianity, contains a complete program for
ordering society. Whereas Christianity provides grand moral instructions but leaves practical details to the discretion of each
community, Islam specifies exact goals for all Muslims to follow
as well as the rules by which to enforce them. If Christians
eager to act on behalf of their faith have no script for political
action, Muslims have one so detailed, so nuanced, it requires
a lifetime of study to master ....
However diverse Muslim public
life may be, it always takes place in the framework of Shar'i
ideals. Adjusting realities to the Shari'a is the key to Islam's
76
role in human relations.
Two critical distinctions between Judaism and Islam, one historical
and one religious, frame discussion of the church-state problematic in
Judaism. The historical fact is that Judaism has all but universally been
carried by people composing a suspect minority in an alien political
environment. Put differently, political organization has rarely coincided
with a cultural matrix formed by Judaism. There has thus been little
historical opportunity for distinctively Jewish thought (that is, not just
thought by Jews on religion and law but their thought grounded in
distinctively Jewish sources or insights) on church-state relations to develop. Both Christianity and Islam have enjoyed by contrast long periods
of learning by their political mistakes, many of them made at Jewish
expense. It is permissible then to posit just two basic strands of Jewish
thought on "church and state": Zionist, or "quietest." The former
favored a "restoration" to the "Promised Land," which implies a
religious state, while the latter favored a "secular" state devoid of
confessional commitments. Obviously the latter preference promises relative safety for dissenting and minority religions. There is an ironic
commonality to the two. Historian R. Laurence Moore suggests that
the ghettoization of Jewish life through most of the common era helped
sustained Judaism by protecting it from assimilation. 77 The resurgent
Zionism of the late nineteenth century is seen by another observer as
the conscious continuation of ghetto life. That is, Jews' desire to preserve
their distinctiveness, abetted for centuries by Gentiles' unwillingness to
share a cultural life with them, crystallized in hospitable historical conditions into a desire to establish a Jewish ghetto of national size."

76. Id. at 11.
77. See R. Moore, Religious Outsiders and the Making of Americans 72-101 (1986).
78. See J. Avineri, The Making of Modern Zionism 3-13 (1981).
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The "religious" contrast to Islam dovetails with this development.
Compared to the Sahri'a, the Halakh contains very few prescriptions
for the exercise of governmental power. The comparative deficit is partly
offset by the abundant scriptural accounts of politically organized Jews
(the Hebrews existed as a tribe before God chose them as his own
people), and the abiding divine promise of a homeland. The difference
then is not in the availability of an overarching divine plan for history
but in the absence in Judaism of anything like the details of that plan.
This brief rehearsal permits the pertinent observations to proceed.
As Eric Voegelin remarks, the Israelites did possess the twin foci, which
in Christian reflection were identified as the "sacred" and the "profane,"
that of "church and state." The "sacred," or divine pull, was supplied
by the Covenant through Moses; the monarchy supplied the necessary
experience of mundane social order.19 But, as Voegelin further concludes,
Judaism before Christ never quite brought the reflection to the maturity
that Christians' claim to see in even the original deposit of revelation. 0
Put differently, the experiential core was present but never fully differentiated itself in the symbols essential to constitute it a decisive social
force. The combination of available concepts and inhospitable historical
circumstances muted the tension's social articulation.
Zionism is a bit of a different story. Zionism refers to the distinctly
Jewish notion of the restoration of God's chosen tribes to the land of
Israel. It is, as E.P. Sanders remarks, almost synonymous with Jewish
eschatology.81 While God's precise role in bringing about restoration is
controverted, Zionism clearly refers to events within historical time.
Thus the mundane pole dominates in this Judaic field of tension.
The Millerites and their Seventh-Day Adventist descendants remind
us that any historical division between Jewish and Christian thought
here is indistinct, and hence a "Judeo-Christian tradition" may be
posited for reasons other than political inclusiveness or sentimental ecuminism. While unquestionably a Christian sect, Adventists continue the
restoration eschatology of first-century Palestinian Judaism. The New
York Times last year reported that a small group of Millenialists were
then awaiting The End (through a divinely wrought tornado) somewhere
in Arkansas. 2 Jehovah's Witnesses still preach the Millenialist gospel,
and Jarislav Pelikan writes that Millienialist expectations survived the
apostolic era, neither heretical nor orthodox but within "the permissible
range of eschatological opinions." 83 Pelikan contends that the Apostle's
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Creed incorporated Millenialist notions in its affirmation of bodily resurrection.14 The work of Norman Cohn"5 demonstrates beyond reasonable
doubt that Millenialism is a constant possibility in the Christian orbit.
Thus the formulation: only the "main trajectory" of Christian thought,
itself heir to Jewish experience and insights, concluded that not the
body but the soul was the subject of gospel promises of deliverance
and salvation, and that the promised kingdom was a purely spiritual
one. Man's destination is eternal life in beatific vision. His earthly
existence then becomes a journey of sanctification which can no longer
be symbolically represented by political society, but only by the church.
The church becomes a flash of that eternity into time, a community
ahead of itself, the "already" of the "already but not yet," the vessel
and the means of that sanctification which carries on after death. The
church becomes effectively an eschatological community with one foot
(at least) in the beyond.
The Christian position does not do away with the field of power,
of political order. Nor could it, for once the Parousia s6 is indefinitely
delayed, ongoing pragmatic existence identified itself as an equivalent
"force" bounding the field of tension. But Christianity does affect the
numdane order: it robs it of any ultimate meaning. Christianity "dedivinizes" or "temporalizes" the sphere of pragmatic power. In Voegelin's formulation, "the power organization of society as a temporal
representation of man in the specific sense of a representation of that
part of human nature that will pass away .... The one Christian society
was articulated into its spiritual and temporal order. s7
So much was implied from the moment and to the extent Christianity
separated itself from an apocalyptic account of the Kingdom. Nevertheless, it remained for Augustine, writing in the early fifth century, to
produce the enduring theoretical statement.8 8 Augustine's special achieve-

ment was to legitimate the mundane pole in the field of tension of
Christians to work for a just temporal order. Historical context helped
direct Augustine's attention. He wrote shortly after the sack of Rome
in 410 and to refute charges that Christianity, specifically the "otherworldliness" of Christians, undermined the pragmatic existence of Romans. There was some truth in the charge; Augustine knew that some
earlier church fathers had been pacifistic and anti-militarist. Less con-

84. Id.at 127.
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spicuous but still powerful in his work is his argument against pagan
remnants within Christianity. Augustine insists that Christian piety is
no more a guarantee of worldly success than pagan piety. He thus frees
the temporal from the spiritual while he sustains Christian involvement
in the world. In effect, Augustine christened the field of tension that
we call "Church and State." He still stands as a corrective to the
common Christian temptations to withdraw from the world, or to redivinize it.
The former position is perhaps more often attributed (with implicit
criticism) to Christians than Christians claim it for themselves. Charges
of "other worldliness" suggest an irresponsible indifference to mundane
affairs, and it is easy to see how that charge may be made. The corrective
(one suggested by Ernest Fortin)s9 is to insist that Christianity is not
"otherworldly" but "transpolitical," that it is engaging this world but
in a way that transcends politics as such (defined as the realm of power
relations), much more particular political systems.
Augustine's conception of the differentiation produced two pairs of
adverse terms. The political community, which we would now call "state"
but which for him was "empire," was contrasted with "church." Each
is a visible community but with different identities. The church prepares
men for eternal beatitude with God, while the "state" governs the regime
of just dealings and civility among all in the polity. But since only God
knows the hearts of men, there are two invisible "cities" overlaying
church and polity: the heavenly City of God and the earthly City of
Man. The saved strive for a goal beyond this life; those who seek no
good beyond the present life are damned.
The basic Augustinian conception of two orders in the one societyone temporal the other spiritual-with accompanying (though hardly
coincident) institutional channels is the achievement of Christianity. This
Christian perspective (in Stanley Jaki's words) destroys "the mesmerizing
impact of a divine sky," and frees man from the "monstrous conception
of a realm of celestial bodies ruling all processes on earth, physical as
well as human." 9 Soon afterward, in 494 A.D., Pope Gelasius wrote
to Byzantine Emperor Anastasius of the mutual independence of spiritual
and civil authority: "Two there are, August Emperor, by which this
world is ruled on title of original and sovereign right-the corrected
authority of the priesthood and the royal power." 91
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In summary, all talk of "Church and state" symbolizes this permanent tension in Western civilization between the demands of successful
pragmatic existence and the consciousness of divine reality arising in
men's souls. In all other religious systems, the distinction is blurred by
the fact that the spiritual and temporal worlds are considered inseparable
parts of the whole of life. "State" and "Church," under the mainstream
Christian approach, are polar pulls in a field of tension. The tradition
provides many cognate symbolizations; the "sacred" and "profane,"
Augustine's two cities; the medieval two "sword" imagery, connoting
the spiritual and temporal powers; Roger Williams' Garden and Wilderness; the Lutheran conception of two kingdoms. Preceding all of
them was the Israelites' tension between Covenant and Kingdom. They
all symbolize (though with varying accents) the tension between experience of the transcendant pull and the demands of successful pragmatic
existence.
CONCLUSION

This brief essay has argued for a necessary relation between a
Christian cultural matrix and "separation of church and state." What
we call "religious freedom" or "religious liberty" -immunity from state
interference on matters spiritual-is possible only where "church" and
"state" are so differentiated. Why? Unless the temporal is distinguished
from the spiritual, talk of letting the spirit roam where it wills is
unintelligible, or presents intolerable threats to civil society. Just try to
insinuate such a rough definition of religious freedom into a pagan or
animist society. Can one really imagine political authority there assuming
the pose of indifference to the affairs of the gods? I think that was
the plight of the Lyng court. That case squarely presented the justices
with the fundamental incompatibility of "separation" and Native American spirituality. A majority blanched, and responded with the contraction of constitutional liberties. My view is that, unless we keep traditional
Christian concepts in analytical view, there will be a lot more such
contracting statements.
Perhaps the most important implication of my argument is the
attending reemergence of a unity beneath "separation." The one society
differentiates the two orders of church and state within it. Both church
and state are distinguishable from the society that manages the tension
between them through public discussion of its commitment to both spirit
and world. When an entire society openly discusses such matters, it is,
in every sense of the phrase, living public life. I submit that precisely
in order to separate church and state and to insure religious liberty,
public disclosure in this country need be frankly religious. It needs to
be decisively rooted in the differentiation between pragmatic exigencies
and the pull toward spiritual perfection in eternity.
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It should by now be clear that within that analytical field, "discrimination" is not an apt term for the situation in Bob Jones, for
instance, especially now when "discrimination" means not just "different" but condemnably so, at best an "injustice" to be tolerated due
to some fuzzy sense that somehow churches may do such bad things.
It is precisely the lot of a church to live by norms unsuited to organize
a polity acting in history. That no doubt is counterintuitive, if intelligible
at all to many in our culture.
This is true partly because the statement presents great risks. This
"church autonomy" means what it always meant. The medieval church
insisted that there was a whole sphere of human thought and action
that was in principle outside the legitimate power of government.9 2 That
this poses considerable risks to political stability is evident from the
scarcity of societies in which such "separation" has occurred. This
autonomy now insists that countries permit within their borders selfdefining communities that significantly determine citizens' opinions affecting faith and practice, including public behavior. Moreover, some
such communities (like the Roman Catholic Church) are part of international associations.93 The moral sovereignty of the political order in
our society-the primacy of liberal definitions of "justice"-will not
lightly tolerate such "autonomy."
That "autonomy" effectively declares war on the new "foundationalism" of liberal justice. It will not be a pleasant engagement, and
I suspect the outcome is already apparent. Anyway, if political life is
distinguished from the Kingdom, we need appropriate conception of
politics in line with that proposed by Martin Marty:
[Plolitics is not the Gospel; it does not save souls or make sad
hearts glad. It is a modest art or science designed to minimize
the violence inherent in history and to assure the components
of society some measure of power proportionate to their weight
and scope in society. 94
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